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MAY 26, 2014

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Last week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reversed the conviction of a criminal defendant for first degree murder after finding that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury as to their deliberations on first degree murder versus the lesser offense of second degree murder.

In Commonwealth v. Figueroa, the defendant did not deny that he shot and killed the victim. Instead, the issue was whether the defendant’s killing was done with the intent to kill or deliberate premeditation. If the jury believed that the defendant had the requisite intent, then a verdict of first degree murder would have been appropriate. However, if the jury believed that the defendant was so intoxicated from alcohol and/or cocaine that he could not have formed the legal intent, then a conviction of second degree murder would have been appropriate.

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Posted In: Homicide , Intoxication Defense , Jury Instructions

JUNE 9, 2014

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On May 19, 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), in Commonwealth v. Sepheus, reversed the conviction of a defendant convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and determined the defendant is entitled to a new trial, because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a portion of the Commonwealth’s expert’s testimony. The portion of the expert’s testimony to which counsel did not object was the expert’s response to questions counsel asked that allowed the expert to offer his own opinion as to the defendant’s guilt.

The defendant was arrested on outstanding warrants in Springfield, MA on September 30, 2009. At the time of the arrest, the defendant was with another man, whom Springfield police observed perform what they believed to be a narcotics transaction. Both the defendant and the other man were arrested. Defendant was found in possession of three small bags of “crack” cocaine, weighing approximately 0.4 grams and packaged individually in the twisted-off corner of a sandwich bag, and $312 in currency. The defendant did not have in his possession a device to ingest the drug.

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Posted In: Drug Offense , Expert Testimony , Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

JUNE 30, 2014

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Last month, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the Boston Municipal Court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his post-arrest breathalyzer test as evidence of his alleged operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The decision examined the regulations applicable to breathalyzer test results and their reliability.

In Commonwealth v. Hourican, the defendant had driven his vehicle into a police patrol wagon. Police observed that the defendant had “glassy eyes” and smelled of alcohol. After failing two out of three field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested. He then consented to a breathalyzer test in which he produced two breath samples. One sample measured 0.121% blood alcohol content (BAC), and the other measured 0.143%, resulting in a differential between the two samples of 0.022%. Both samples indicated that the defendant’s BAC level was above the legal limit of 0.08%.

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Posted In: Breathalyzer Tests , OUI , Operating Under the Influence

JULY 28, 2014

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Last month, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reaffirmed a concept it established in 1996 in Commonwealth v. Rosario – known as the “Rosario rule” – which makes any statements made by a defendant more than six hours after his arrest, but before his arraignment, per se inadmissible against him, absent his valid waiver of his right to be arraigned without delay.

In Commonwealth v. Powell, the police suspected the defendant’s involvement in a murder that occurred in February 2010. On June 14, 2010, at 1:30 P.M. the police arrested the defendant on charges of larceny of a motor vehicle occurring on the night of the murder. Although the police likely had enough probable cause to charge the defendant with the murder as well, they had not yet been authorized to bring those charges. 

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Posted In: Arraignment , Interrogation

Last month, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reaffirmed a concept it established in 1996 in Commonwealth v. Rosario – known as the “Rosario rule” – which makes any statements made by a defendant more than six hours after his arrest, but before his arraignment, per se inadmissible against him, absent his valid waiver of his right to be arraigned without delay.

In Commonwealth v. Powell, the police suspected the defendant’s involvement in a murder that occurred in February 2010. On June 14, 2010, at 1:30 P.M. the police arrested the defendant on charges of larceny of a motor vehicle occurring on the night of the murder. Although the police likely had enough probable cause to charge the defendant with the murder as well, they had not yet been authorized to bring those charges. 

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Posted In: Arraignment , Interrogation

AUGUST 4, 2014

Last month, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a criminal defendant’s conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon due to insufficient evidence that the knife he was carrying was the type of knife prohibited under the applicable statute.

In Commonwealth v. Higgins, the defendant was convicted of violating M.G.L. c. 269 §10(b), which makes it illegal for anyone to carry certain kinds of knives deemed to be dangerous weapons. This conviction came as somewhat of a surprise, as the jury failed to also convict the defendant of the aggravated assault and battery charge that was the centerpiece of the trial.

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Posted In: Assault and Battery , Dangerous Weapons , Evidence

AUGUST 11, 2014

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After Massachusetts made it legal to possess one ounce or less of marijuana, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruled in Commonwealth v. Cruz that the odor of burnt marijuana alone could not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a warrantless search. In a recent case, the SJC expanded that decision and held that the smell of unburnt marijuana does not provide probable cause for the police to search a vehicle.

In Commonwealth v. Overmyer, the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle crash. When the police arrived at the scene, they encountered a “very strong odor” of unburnt marijuana emanating from the defendant’s vehicle. After questioning the defendant about marijuana being present in the vehicle, the defendant acknowledged that a bag of marijuana was in the glove compartment, and gave the keys to the police. After the police retrieved a “fat bag” of marijuana, the officers continued to smell an odor or marijuana in the vehicle, and questioned the defendant about the possibility of the vehicle obtaining a larger amount of marijuana. Although the defendant denied this, the police proceeded with a search of the car, and found a backpack in the back seat filled with marijuana. 

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Posted In: Automobile Search , Possession , Probable Cause , Search and Seizure